

The establishment of the Irish-Spanish relationship

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At the outset of the modern period, Ireland enjoyed commercial relations with Spain but no political relationship. The island was a divided country under loose English control but its situation changed with developments in the European State system. Ireland was affected by the centralizing policies of the Tudor state, by the greed of its burgeoning capitalist elite for land and office in the Irish dependency and by increasing Tudor fears of foreign state interference in Ireland as a result of European balance of power politics. Reacting to these pressures during the sixteenth-century, Irish leaders became pawns in Spanish grand strategy. In their attempt to escape the tightening shackles of English tyranny, they paid a high price for a haphazard support from Europe's leading power.

When Charles V became King in 1516, he inherited a long-standing alliance with the English crown against France. If as Holy Roman Emperor from 1519 he considered Ireland at all, it was to worry that the French might take advantage of the situation there. In these circumstances dissident Irish leaders normally looked to the French monarchy for support; at the time the most notable was the detached leader of Munster, James Fitzgerald, the earl of Desmond. With war between France and England in the early 1520s, this 'prince of Ireland' signed a treaty with Francis I to put a Yorkist pretender on the English throne.¹ However, with French power temporarily eclipsed, he dramatically changed tack in 1528 and sent an agent to Spain. The agenda was a forerunner of many similar appeals: 'his master and other gentles of Ireland desire the Emperor to take him and them as subjects, because the king does not administer Justice, and because their first progeny came from Spain. They ask for handguns, artillery and powder'.² Charles V, who was not interested in the sovereignty of Ireland, saw an opportunity to pressurize his erstwhile ally. He expressed annoyance with Henry VIII's plans to divorce his aunt Catherine of Aragon and to disinherit her daughter Princess Mary by promoting the illegitimate Henry FitzRoy as governor of Ireland. As a result he sent his chaplain Gonzalo Fernandez to negotiate in 1529.³ His visit was a template for later Spanish fact-finding

¹ James Hogan, *Ireland in the European System* (London, 1920), ch. 2.

² LP Hen VIII, IV, pt.2, 2110.

³ *Cal. Carew*, I, .42-3.

missions. At Dingle the earl - claiming royal ancestry, military support across Ireland and friendship with the king of Scotland - submitted to imperial authority.⁴ Gonzalo's own report was more circumspect and, with the emperor's various international commitments, nothing ever came of the Dingle accord.⁵

Charles V took a similar approach to the Kildare revolt of 1534. To teach the now divorced and schismatic Henry VIII a lesson Charles had – following his London ambassador's suggestion about encouraging Irish dissidents - sent another agent to Dingle. This intervention in the spring of 1534 was one of the triggers of the uprising as it led Lord Offaly to believe – mistakenly – that he would be succoured by an imperial army. The revolt also exploited the new religious dimension because of Henry VIII's break with Rome, using churchmen as envoys and approaching the Pope to exercise his alleged donative power in relation to sovereignty. These overtures to the Pope and Emperor merely increased the ferocity of the English suppression of the revolt. As it collapsed, Offaly sent messengers direct to Spain, but Charles, it seems, had never any intention of intervening in Ireland; his main objective had been to keep Henry VIII sufficiently distracted there to avoid an Anglo-French campaign against him whilst engaged in the expedition to Tunis.⁶ The Geraldine League which followed, briefly united Gaelic and Anglo-Irish magnates in opposition to an English Protestant conquest and made appeals to the Pope and Scots king. The Irish had been barking up the wrong tree with Charles V. Despite dynastic and religious changes in England, the emperor could not afford to see England disadvantaged strategically as the main beneficiary would have been France. As a result the Irish sensibly concentrated their main conspiratorial efforts in the latter direction, often via France's northern allies, the kings of Scotland. And when the Irish were defeated, it was in France they took refuge, the most famous example being the young earl of Kildare.

In the short term the marriage of Philip II to Mary Tudor seemed to rectify and complete the evolution of Anglo-Spanish policy. The reign of Philip and Mary as monarchs of England and Ireland saw the restoration of Catholicism, the containment of France, and indeed the forwarding of the conquest of Ireland with the establishment of the King's and Queen's counties, their shire towns appropriately named Philipston and Maryborough. Philip's status as titular joint monarch ended when Mary died and Elizabeth ascended the English throne in 1558. The following year he rejected a request from Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond, to send an invasion force to Ireland to install by the authority of the Holy See a resident monarchy under 'a virtuous and totally Catholic prince'.⁷ Even though the Protestant Elizabeth had refused the king's hand and the offer of full legatine authority, Spain saw no need to depose her, let alone interfere in her Irish kingdom. However that changed over the following decade. First France's dynastic problems with a succession of weak monarchs and a escalating

⁴ *Cal. S.P. Spanish*, III, pt.2, 992-5.

⁵ *Cal. S.P. Spanish*, IV, pt 1, 30-1.

⁶ Laurence MacCorrestine, *The Revolt of Silken Thomas: a challenge to Henry VIII* (Dublin, 1987), 74-78, 93-6, 112-3.

⁷ AGS E812 f.200.

series of religious wars meant that it was no longer a threat to Spain and that would remain the case for the next thirty years. Secondly the implosion of Mary Queen of Scots' reign and her flight into England meant that Elizabeth no longer had to worry about Scotland and its French allies. The result was that England and Spain no longer needed each other – indeed they were increasingly at odds over the Netherlands and over American trade.

Thereafter the Irish came to focus their overseas effort increasingly on the now unrivalled superpower of the day, Spain but this did not necessarily bring the rapid responses required to answer the deepening crisis they faced. Philip II's worldwide empire faced challenges everywhere. Even when it did consider the situation in the British Isles it focused on England and on its dissidents and Catholic exiles rather than taking advantage of the greater strategic possibilities offered in Ireland. The first major applicant for aid was James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, captain of Desmond. He was leading a revolt in Munster against English-imposed changes and sent Maurice Fitzgibbon, Archbishop of Cashel, to Spain. The mission failed but the correspondence generated is instructive. The Anglo-Spanish crisis provoked by Elizabeth's confiscation of ships carrying treasure to pay Alba's army in the Low Countries presented opportunities. Philip asked the Duke of Alba for advice. The Irish wanted military assistance and were willing to accept a prince of his appointing and he was inclined to help them on religious grounds. For present he was entertaining Fitzgibbon 'with fair words and money for his expenses' knowing his presence in Spain would increase the pressure of Elizabeth in the current negotiations and hoping that something could be done for the Irish in the process of restoring normal relations. 'If, however, the Queen should be shameless enough to force us to break with her, I think it would be well to seize Ireland, as they are constantly begging me to do, and it could be done easily with troops sent from Spain. If once she saw me in possession of that island, it would give her something to think about.'⁸ The Spanish government began collecting intelligence about Ireland but the Duke of Alba was opposed on grounds of cost and priority to any invasion of Ireland, let alone one of England, though he did suggest supporting the Irish insurgents financially as a means of bringing Elizabeth to heel.

Fitzmaurice's astute letter to Fitzgibbon in May 1570 is also apposite. Without a prompt and positive reply from Philip II, they would be forced to make peace even though from past experience the English did trust them to stick to any agreement. Rather than losing a bargaining chip in negotiations with England, Fitzmaurice was offering Spain not only Irish support but also a means of reigniting the Northern rebellion in England as some of its participants were refugees in his camp. To achieve these ends he and his 'parliament' wanted Don John of Austria as king. 'As soon as Don John sets foot in Ireland all our people will give him their allegiance and will make him not only King of Ireland but also of other foreign provinces which we will subject to his rule. For if we had a King like other nations none would venture to attack us, on account of the spirit of our people in war, the stoutness of their hearts, and the fertility of their soil. Because we have not a King and are divided amongst ourselves the English attack and

⁸ *Cal. S.P. Spanish (Simancas)*, II, 210-11.

rob us daily and we suffer grievously as a result'. Furthermore in warning the archbishop to expedite this task the letter it made clear that he was a servant of the politicians at home.⁹ However at this time the Pope issued a bull of excommunication – *Regnans in Excelsis* – against Elizabeth which legitimised the Irish struggle and strengthened the role of the Catholic clergy as political agents at home and supplicants abroad. The Prudent King had not been consulted about the Papal sentence and refused to assist in its implementation but privately it worked on his frustrations with England and encouraged his messianic side. As a result the attention he showed to Thomas Stukley the English adventurer who had arrived at Court was more than simply another ploy against Elizabeth. He had served in South Leinster in Ireland and Fitzgibbon, who in vain tried to work with him, found himself eclipsed. An attack by Stukley on the South of Ireland was included in Philip's multi-faceted Rodolfi Plot to depose Elizabeth but as Alba had feared its discovery caused irrevocable damage to Anglo-Spanish relations. Although in 1574 Philip considered using a fleet being assembled at Santander for Low Countries to descend on Ireland, later the same year he signed the treaty of Bristol with England in which they agreed to not support each other's opponents.

When Fitzmaurice, forced to make peace in 1573, went into exile the following year, he headed first for France and then for Rome. There the English lobby ensured that the bulk of Papal military support was given to Stukley but at Lisbon in 1578 the self-styled 'Duke of Leinster' joined King Sebastian's mad crusade to Morocco. Nevertheless Philip II – as a warning to Elizabeth for sending Drake on his circumnavigation - permitted first Fitzmaurice to go to Ireland with a small force and then 600 Papal reinforcements to follow him to Smerwick. These interventions long sought by the Irish proved to be uncoordinated half measures and the only result was the disastrous Desmond and Baltinglass revolts. The plantation of Munster which followed strengthened the English presence in southern Ireland with the intention of breaking Ireland's lines of communication with Spain and by denying the latter a convenient and friendly disembarkation place. Many Irish both lay and religious fleeing the English conquest now sought asylum in Spanish territories and the most useful were made pensioners of the crown. After war finally broke out over the Netherlands, the English Catholic Sir William Stanley defected with his mostly Irish regiment in 1587. Many of these émigrés became activists in an emerging Irish Catholic cause such as Conor O'Mulryan, bishop of Killaloe, based in Lisbon in Portugal, Philip's newly-acquired launch pad against Elizabeth. About a 1,000 Irish served on the Armada. Although rejected as a landing place in the planning stages in favour of a complicated rendezvous and invasion of Kent, the political consequences for Ireland were far greater than for England.¹⁰

The shipwreck of many Armada ships proved a turning point, indeed Philip O'Sullivan Beare, the first chronicler of the Hiberno-Spanish relationship, dates the conflict originating in Ulster known as the Nine Years War between 1594 and

⁹AGS legajo 8336 f.27, quoted in Cyril Falls, *Elizabeth's Irish Wars* (London, 1950), 139-141.

¹⁰ Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (London, 1998), 158-64, 186-7.

1603 as the Fifteen Years War.¹¹ 23 ships were lost on the Irish coast; over 6,000 men were drowned, killed or captured. Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam ordered the execution of survivors but in Irish controlled-districts many had an opportunity to escape and several hundred made the treacherous journey to Flanders via Scotland. Although the Armada had failed, it was a visible demonstration of Spanish power, wealth and intent. Not only was its gold and silver an immediate windfall to the locals but the wreckage of its great ships and their enormous cannons lay for many years on the western and northern coasts of Ireland as a monumental reminders of Spanish antagonism towards England. Hugh O'Neill was one such Irish lord in the midst of this crisis. He had recently gained the earldom of Tyrone only to find the government taking steps to curtail his power, including the kidnapping and imprisoning of his son-in-law Hugh O'Donnell. Tyrone's troops, commanded by his Hovenden foster-brothers and counselled by Lord and Lady O'Donnell, committed the largest single massacre of survivors in Inishowen. Government officials suspected O'Neill and relayed his reported reproof to O'Donnell 'for doing service upon the Spaniards saying that he and his posterity may go seek a dwelling in another country, for that they had betrayed the Spaniards, who were their best friends and their only refuge in all extremities'. O'Neill himself helped three sick Spanish officers and an ordinary seaman Pedro Blanco remained as his faithful Spanish manservant.¹² O'Neill waited; only Brian O'Rourke of West Breifne openly recruited the Spaniards as soldiers and as a result he was expelled from the country by English land-grabbers who employed the possible threat of the Irish working with Spain to drive the frontier of government control northwards.

At the beginning of 1592 Hugh O'Donnell was sprung from the prison of Dublin Castle in a daring escape arranged by his father-in-law. Later that year Edmund McGauran archbishop of Armagh returned from Spain at an opportune moment. In exile he had contacts with Sir William Stanley and before departure he met Philip II who was approving the establishment of the first Irish college for the education of Irish clergy. Philip knew Ireland was increasingly important to Spain as war dragged on with England but offered support only on condition of prior military action. In the North of Ireland a bishops' conference was followed by oath-taking meetings with the political elite who were stunned by the state's recent executions of McMahan and O'Rourke. With the Maguire territory of Fermanagh the latest flashpoint between the Dublin government and the Gaelic lords, Archbishop O'Healy of Tuam was sent on a mission to Spain which, emphasizing the ancient Spanish origins of the Irish, the persecutions they were suffering as Catholics and the strategic importance of their country, requested the urgent dispatch of between 8 and 10,000 soldiers. Although O'Donnell and Maguire were the main backers of O'Healy's embassy to Spain, it is a highly unlikely that these sons-in-law of the earl would have written letters without his foreknowledge. O'Healy made this clear when he met Idiáquez, who handled the king's English and Irish business, in the Escorial: 'The Irish archbishop of Tuam says that it will be of great importance for the success of the confederacy of Irish Catholics, that Your Majesty should write very affectionately to the earl of

¹¹ Philip O'Sullivan, *Historiae Catholicae Iberniae Compendium* (Lisbon, 1621), 138-204.

¹² National Archives, UK, SP63/137, 10(1,5).

Tyrone, whose name is O'Neill to induce him to enter into the confederacy openly. He already belongs to it secretly, and he should be assured that Your Majesty's aid shall not fail them'. Although Philip felt the Archbishop's demands were heavy, he thought that it would be a pity not to help the Irish. He instructed his secretary to 'see what is the very smallest aid that will be needed. If it be so small that we can give it, we will help them'.¹³ As a result Idiáquez arranged for a boat to carry O'Healy, some Spanish experts, and a few Irish émigrés back to Ireland to gather information and raise the standard of revolt countrywide. However in March 1594 the boat and its occupants were lost on the sandbars of Santander.¹⁴

In 1595 Tyrone defeated the English at Clontibret and Mullaghbrack. Although his messengers to Spain had been detained, O'Mulryan and his Burgos-based fellow exile, Tadhg O'Farrell, Bishop of Clonfert, travelled to Madrid and appraised Idiáquez of this situation. It was military success that Spain took notice of rather than plaintiff cries for help. The Irish war was drawing considerable English resources in terms of money, men and materiel away from their continental endeavours against Spain. When Tyrone made a submission to the English crown and entered detailed negotiations with its commissioners, Philip II became anxious to prevent the Irish Catholics from concluding peace. The urgency was so great that Philip dispatched three separate missions to Ireland at the same time in the spring of 1596 to ensure that contact was re-established with the Irish and links formalised. The crucial link was forged by Ensign Alonso Cobos at a meeting at Lifford. In a speech to the Gaelic lords who gathered there he played on the alleged Iberian origins of the Irish – the Milesian myth – and emphasized the possibilities of the Pope switching the kingship of Ireland away from the now heretical English monarch to a more amenable Catholic prince instead. To ensure that the confederates broke off their peace treaty with the English, Cobos claimed that Philip had already raised soldiers to intervene on their behalf. As a result, the Irish leaders, who like their predecessors in earlier conflicts did not trust English promises, agreed to renege on a compromise peace with England and offered themselves as vassals of the Spanish crown. O'Neill and O'Donnell requested the appointment of a Habsburg Prince to rule over them and asked for the dispatch of 6,000 soldiers and arms for 10,000 of their own men to free them for English tyranny. This was a fateful decision. O'Neill and his colleagues had entered the arena of international politics in which they had no experience and where their interests and those of Ireland counted for very little. They had become pawns in a game being played for the highest stakes.

The second expedition arrived as Cobos was setting sail. Another conference was held at Donegal. Cisneros and Medinilla found the lords united; O'Neill and O'Donnell acted as one and they were respected by the rest. This time the discussions went into greater detail about possible landing sites for an armada. In further letters to Philip II, O'Neill and O'Donnell reiterated their demands

¹³ *Cal S.P. Spanish (Simancas)*, IV, 610-11

¹⁴ Hiram Morgan, *Tyrone's rebellion: The outbreak of the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland* (Woodbridge, 1993), chs. 3-6.

insisting that, without prompt assistance, they would be forced to make peace with the English. Unlike the first expedition, Cisneros and Medinilla brought the lords a supply of munitions which was divided proportionately amongst the allies in accordance with rank. Captain Medinilla and two experienced soldiers had been instructed to remain in Ireland as military advisers but the confederates decided that it was too risky. The success of the first two expeditions rendered the third relatively unimportant and O'Neill and O'Donnell left its business to their interpreter.¹⁵ Over the next five years such expeditions became crucial in maintaining secure contact between Spain and the Irish lords. It was a continuous refrain in the letters of Sir Geoffrey Fenton, Secretary of the Irish Council, that the Spaniards would ultimately disappoint the Irish and he told them so when he met them in negotiations: 'They have no reason to be confident in the support of Spain, considering how vain and fallible the Spanish promises have been heretofore, both to them and others in this realm, and it may thought that the uttermost that Spain will do at this time, is to bear up the quarrel with money, whereby a war may be kept on foot, to the end to divert Her Majesty from the aid of the Low Countries or Brittany, or to hold her engaged in Ireland, that she may have the less means to trouble the Spaniard in some parts of his own territories'¹⁶

The Irish pretended that they had not accepted the Spanish offer and turned over 'The King of Spain's letter' in an attempt to avoid detection. At the end of summer, 1596 Cobos returned to announce that the king, to revenge the sack of Cadiz, was quickly assembling a fleet at Lisbon and he would send it to Ireland. 'I spoke to O'Neill and O'Donnell apart, and said that at last the hour they had longed for had arrived, and that before winter set in the succour they had so often requested would be there. I urged them to set about what raids they could, to show their zeal and also to make the necessary arrangements secretly for the reception of our force. They thanked His Majesty and said they were always ready and waiting, like the faithful vassals they were.'¹⁷ The Irish kept their word launching big attacks against the English Pale but the promised expedition never arrived.¹⁸ The fleet was wrecked off Galicia, losing up to 30 ships, thousands of men including Irish émigrés who had boarded at Lisbon and large amounts of treasure. Unbeknownst to the Irish leaders or the Irish émigrés, Philip had at the last minute redirected the fleet to assist French Catholic malcontents in Brittany. Its commander Padilla was incensed about this sudden change of plan which seemed to have no rationale. Cisneros returned to Ulster the following spring with gold and gunpowder. He found the Irish leaders angry but they agreed to fight until midsummer when he informed them that another expedition was preparing to depart for Ireland.¹⁹ Cisneros had again exaggerated the likelihood of an imminent Spanish landing. Although Padilla's armada was regrouping, its men were riddled with disease and its objectives far from clear.

¹⁵ Morgan, *Tyrone's Rebellion*, 210-1.

¹⁶ *Cal. S.P. Ireland*, V, 458.

¹⁷ *Cal. S.P. Spanish (Simancas)*, IV, 638-9.

¹⁸ SP63/194, 19; 195, 38 & 40; 196,13(1).

¹⁹ SP 63/198, 76; AGS E492, Report of Cisneros, undated.

The king of Spain's increasing erratic war strategy was again in evidence when in the summer of 1597, he aimed his last abortive Armada directly at England.²⁰

The Irish never received the aid promised by the agents of Philip II. They obtained more positive assistance during the idealistic early years of his successor but its dispatch was too late. Philip III re-established contact by sending Barrionuevo in the summer of 1599 and the Irish lords renewed their dependency by swearing oaths on a missal and crucifix. The division of the money and munitions delivered on that occasion caused a quarrel between O'Neill and O'Donnell with the latter challenging an equal portion.²¹ This points to one reason why the Irish persisted in the alliance with Spain which was yielding them very little. The alternative idea of making O'Neill king of Ireland was canvassed in Rome; this policy would have suited Pope Clement as he wished to separate the Papacy from advancing Spanish interests and balance it with the re-emerging power of post-civil war France. However in Ireland an O'Neill monarchy would have provoked jealousies from other magnate families. When the Pope appointed Cardinal Mansoni as nuncio, O'Neill joined with the Spanish authorities to ensure his delay in Spain. What he wanted from the Pope was unequivocal spiritual support in the form of an excommunication of non-supporters, not political interference. Furthermore Spanish military intervention was essential. Unable to win the Irish towns either militarily by mounting sieges or diplomatically through James Archer's faith and fatherland formulations, the Irish confederates needed a fully-equipped army. Indeed as Lord Deputy Mountjoy's offensive gained momentum in 1600, it became increasingly urgent simply to save the Irish Confederacy from defeat.

The arrival of Don Martín de la Cerdá and Fray Mateo De Oviedo in 1600 was critical in preparing for intervention. O'Neill now committed himself, sending his second son, Henry, to be brought up in Spain as a pledge of good faith. The report of the Franciscan Oviedo, recently appointed Archbishop of Dublin, to Philip III was favourable. He and Cerdá had managed to reassure the Irish who discussed matters like prudent men rather than savages and who received the gold chains and portraits of the king like true subjects. 'They are very grateful for the arms and munitions, &c., and I, for my own part, humbly supplicate your Majesty to bear in mind the great importance of this business, for with 6,000 men you may carry through an enterprise which will bridle English insolence in Flanders, and secure Spain and the Indies from molestation'.²² Philip III now committed himself to seeing that the Irish expedition happened but there was no tangible progress during 1600.²³ In November the Spaniards sent Cerdá with a large consignment of money and guns. But O'Donnell was literally hopping mad and O'Neill was fearful that they were being palmed off: 'For', saith he 'the

²⁰ Edward Tenace, 'A strategy of reaction: the Armadas of 1596 and 1597', *English Historical Review*, (2003), 855-82.

²¹ *Cal. S.P. Ireland*, VIII, 71

²² *Cal. S.P. Spanish (Simancas)*, IV, 655-6.

²³ J.J. Silke. *Kinsale: the Spanish Intervention in Ireland at the end of the Elizabethan Wars* (Liverpool, 1970), 74-8.

Duke de Savoy and the King of France are at war and that the King of Spain will help the Duke of Savoy and therefore he will not be able to spare men'.²⁴

In 1601 the diplomatic situation at last moved in Ireland's favour when France had made peace with Savoy thereby opening up new possibilities for Spain. However, the expeditionary force was small – only 4,423 men. It was scattered in storms and most of it landed in Kinsale far from the confederate stronghold of Ulster. It was conservatively led by Don Juan del Águila who stayed put in the town where he was quickly encircled. Whilst the Anglo-Irish towns stood aside, the local Gaelic Irish adhered to the cause, in particular the O'Sullivans who were triggered into action by the secondary landing at Castlehaven. O'Neill was forced to march three hundred kilometres to the relief of Kinsale. In December 1601 O'Neill and his confederates managed to establish contact with Don Juan across the trenches constructed by the interposing English with various Spanish ensigns and Pedro Blanco, O'Neill's servant, acting as messengers. A joint plan was reached without the knowledge of the English besiegers but its execution went badly awry. Although the Spanish battlefield reports noted the lack of discipline shown by the Irish troops in the engagement and some even suggested that O'Neill had no intention of following the pre-determined plan, most of the blame in the subsequent investigation fell on Zubiaur, the Spanish commander at Castlehaven. He was accused of not following orders from Águila and requests from O'Neill to send all his forces to join with the Irish outside Kinsale.²⁵ Immediately after the battle O'Neill sent O'Donnell in person to request further help. O'Donnell's mission weakened by Águila's withdrawal, was unsuccessful; he died at Simancas in 1602.

Spain was by now weary of the expensive and fruitless war against England and the accession of the hitherto neutral James of Scotland as king of England and Ireland provided the opportunity of serious peace negotiations. Even though its plenipotentiaries were instructed to obtain concessions for Catholics, this position was abandoned and as a result their erstwhile Irish allies were omitted from the Treaty of London. Spain was content with a reversion to the status quo ante because it regarded England as a natural counterweight against France which was now returning to its normal place in European affairs. When Hugh O'Neill and Rory O'Donnell fled to the continent with their dependents in 1607, they proved an embarrassment to their Spanish hosts. Though feted as Catholic heroes in the Low Countries, they were quickly shunted off to Rome to avoid any damage to the Anglo-Spanish entente. They petitioned Philip III citing their Milesian origins, the commitment they made to his father in 1596, the long and costly war they had fought and the political and religious oppression they had suffered subsequently. They wanted help with the restoration of their lands and liberties but O'Donnell died in 1608 and O'Neill in 1616 with their petitions unanswered. Yet Spain had lost nothing in developing the relationship with Ireland. Indeed many of the refugees made excellent soldiers with Henry O'Neill

²⁴ SP 63/208, pt 2, 15(1).

²⁵ Morgan (ed.), *The Battle of Kinsale* (Bray, 2004), ch. 6

being chosen in 1605 as commander of the first Irish regiment in Spanish service.
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²⁶ Micheline Kerney-Walsh, *Destruction by Peace: Hugh O'Neill after Kinsale* (Armagh, 1986), passim.